2024/04/08 - Colorado - Mount Bethel, above Herman Gulch

Published 2024/04/16 by Ethan Greene, Ben Pritchett, Brian Lazar, Drew Gibson, Jason Konigsberg - Colorado Avalanche Information Center

Warm weather in the first week of April formed stiff, slick crusts on many slopes near and below treeline in the Front Range mountains. On April 6 and 7, 2024, nine inches of snow fell at the Loveland Basin SNOTEL site, three miles southwest of the accident site. Extremely strong westerly winds followed the storm, scouring the upper portions of the northeast face of Mount Bethel back to old snow surfaces. Deep, dense drifts several feet thick formed near treeline and unusually low in the terrain.

Worker 1 was an avalanche forecaster at the CAIC. On the morning of April 8, he planned a day of fieldwork for the Center. He planned to collect information on the development of Wind Slab avalanche conditions in the area and evaluate the sensitivity of a persistent weak layer in the snowpack. He submitted a trip plan that included his route, return time, goals for the day, potential hazards, and how he would manage his risk. He reviewed his trip plan with another CAIC forecaster as required by the Center’s field safety plan. He left the Herman Gulch trailhead at 10:30 AM, ascending the east ridge of Mount Bethel on skis. He reached treeline around noon and spent the next hour digging snow profiles and investigating snowpack conditions.

Worker 1 found stiff wind-drifted snow over a hard melt-freeze crust. The underlying snowpack showed signs of rounding and strengthening and was moist throughout. Snowpack tests produced moderate failures under the recently drifted snow (see profile image).

He finished his observations and began a slow downward traverse. He followed a low-angled gully (20 to 25 degrees) northward toward the valley bottom and the Herman Gulch trail. At approximately 1:30 PM, Worker 1 heard a loud booming collapse as an avalanche broke about 40 feet above him. He attempted to ski out of the moving debris, which consisted of large hard snow blocks. He deployed his avalanche airbag before losing a ski. He turned to the skier’s right and tried to ski out of the avalanche on one ski. The avalanche knocked him off his feet and swept him approximately 50 vertical feet downhill. When the avalanche stopped, Worker 1 was partially buried, pinned against several trees in an upright sitting position with his legs, lower torso, and left arm buried under the snow.

Worker 1 tried to free himself, but could not. His cell phone was in the left thigh pocket of his pants and he used his free hand and a ski pole to tear the pocket open and reach the phone. Once he got it, he realized it had been damaged in the avalanche and was no longer working. He tried to reach the equipment in his backpack. His pack was on his back with the sternum, waist, and leg straps on. The tree he was pinned against prevented access to his waist belt and leg strap, so he could not release them to access the contents of his pack. Eventually, he got into his pack through the top opening and retrieved extra layers, food, and his satellite communication device. He sent a distress call from the satellite communication device at 4:30 PM. Avalanche debris and tree canopy interfered with the message transmission. He repositioned the device over the next 30 to 40 minutes until messages began to transmit successfully. The CAIC received the emergency transmission at 5:11 PM.

Worker 1's trip plan said he would be out of the field by 5:00 PM. When he did not return, CAIC staff tried to reach Worker 1 by phone, radio, and calling his emergency contact. When they couldn’t reach him, they checked his satellite communication device. The last transmission was at 1:20 PM and sent from the bottom of a small avalanche path in a stand of trees on the east side of Mount Bethel. At 5:04 PM CAIC staff initiated a rescue response, sending staff members and a volunteer to the Herman Gulch area. They called 911 and activated search and rescue upon receiving Worker 1’s SOS message at 5:11 PM. The CAIC staff and volunteer left the Herman Gulch trailhead around 6:15 PM. CAIC dispatch directed them to Worker 1 using satellite tracking, radios, and shared digital maps. They reached Worker 1 at 7:23 PM, dug him out of the snow, assessed his injuries, and began warming him.

Clear Creek County Sheriff’s Office deployed Alpine Rescue Team at 5:42 PM. At 7:09 PM, a Flight for Life helicopter flew two Alpine Rescue Team members and a rescue sled to a landing site about a quarter mile north of the accident site. Between 7:30 and 8:00 PM, members of Alpine Rescue Team arrived at the avalanche site with additional equipment. At 8:09 PM, they started skiing Worker 1 downhill in the rescue sled. They arrived at the trailhead at 10:15 PM. Worker 1 was transported to a hospital by ground ambulance.

We do our best to describe avalanche involvements to help the people involved and the community as a whole better understand them. We offer the following comments with the hope that they will help people avoid future avalanche accidents.

Worker 1 was at work and operating under the CAIC's Field Safety Plan (FSP). As such, there was a detailed description of where Worker 1 would be traveling, the time he planned to return, and the specific equipment he was carrying, including a satellite communication device that was turned on and tracking.  

The satellite communication device was crucial in this accident. When Worker 1 missed his check-in time, CAIC dispatch could pinpoint his location and communicate it to staff in the field and search and rescue personnel. Once Worker 1 reached his device, he could call for help and communicate the extent of his injuries. This allowed responders to bring the equipment they needed to treat his injuries and evacuate him from the field. The speed of the rescue response highlights the importance of trip planning, communication, and having an emergency response plan. However, Worker 1’s communication device was in his pack and the nature of his burial made it very hard for him to reach it. His cell phone was connected to the device, but was damaged in the avalanche and unusable. It took Worker 1 around two and a half hours to retrieve the device and another 30 to 40 minutes to send a distress message. Carrying communication equipment is important, but considering how you will use it in an emergency is just as important.  

When Worker 1 realized he was in an avalanche, he deployed his airbag. Airbag packs reduce the risk of deep burials and may offer some protection from traumatic injury. In this case, we do not know if deploying the airbag contributed to Worker 1's partial burial or reduced his injuries. 

Worker 1's trip plan, reviewed with another staff member, said he would avoid “steep wind-drifted slopes that can produce size 2 avalanches.” Worker 1 triggered the avalanche traversing a portion of the slope that was between 20 and 25 degrees in steepness. He misjudged the slope angle of the terrain above him where the avalanche broke, which was 30 to 35 degrees. He was traveling to minimize his exposure to wind-drifted terrain and misjudged the potential for the connected slope to produce an avalanche large enough to catch and injure him. This highlights that professionals with experience, training, and a well-reasoned trip plan are not infallible.  

Worker 1 was traveling alone. CAIC staff work outside in the mountains throughout the year, accomplishing a wide variety of tasks. The benefit of each task varies significantly, as do the hazards to which Center staff are exposed. The Center’s approach to risk management for any work project is to maintain a process that allows staff to identify hazards, plan mitigation strategies, and compare the residual risk with the benefit to the program. This process does not preclude traveling alone. Nor does it allow solo travel in every circumstance. Traveling alone brings additional risks and thus requires a larger safety margin. If you are caught in an avalanche or just injured in the field, having a partner gives you more options and increases your chance of survival. 

This accident involved a CAIC employee who was at work. We are grateful that our colleague survived the accident without life-threatening injuries. The accident reinforces the importance of a robust field safety plan, learning from accidents and near misses, and continual refinement of organizational procedures. The outcome of this accident could have been much worse. The CAIC’s procedures, capable staff, the support of emergency responders, and the good fortune of surviving the initial avalanche all contributed to a better outcome. 

We would like to thank Alpine Rescue Team, Flight for Life, Clear Creek County EMS, and the Clear Creek County Sheriff’s Office for their timely and professional response. They did amazing work helping to extricate Worker 1 and transport him as quickly and safely as possible.