2024/03/06 - Colorado - Eyre Creek, Taylor Park

Published 2024/03/13 by Ben Pritchett, Brian Lazar - Colorado Avalanche Information Center

Snowpack depths around the Upper Gunnison Basin were nearly normal for November and early December 2023. Dry and cold weather dominated the weather pattern from mid-December into the first week of January. Snowpack depth dropped far below normal, and snow surfaces became very weak and faceted. Several snowy weeks in mid-January returned snow depths to just above normal for the time of year.

A layer of large-grained surface hoar formed during dry, cold weather in late January. CAIC forecasters documented the surface hoar across much of western Colorado. On February 2, light snowfall buried the surface hoar layer, gently preserving it upright as a fragile weak layer. Snowfall through February 10 steadily built a soft slab atop the surface hoar.

The Upper Taylor SNOTEL site, about one and a half miles northwest of the accident site, gained 3.2 inches of snow water equivalent in two significant storms between February 26 and March 6. Both storms came with strong to extreme west-southwest winds, which drifted several feet of snow onto the slope above the accident site and most open northerly and easterly-facing terrain in the area. Investigators observed at least 20 large avalanches (D2 to 2.5) near the accident site in the Italian Creek area.

Riders 1 through 6 spent the week of March 3, 2024, at backcountry cabins owned by the riders and snowmobiling in the Italian Creek drainage and surrounding areas. They had ridden in this area for decades, knew the terrain very well, and spent the previous several days riding low-angle terrain.

On the morning of March 6, Riders 1 through 5 left the cabins around 9:15 AM. They planned to travel northeast through a narrow pass into the Eyre Creek basin to ride some untracked snow. Rider 6 stayed behind in his cabin.

The group traveled across some low-angle terrain and dropped through the pass into a shallow gully between steep northeast and southwest-facing slopes. They were riding single-file, spaced about 150 feet apart. Rider 1 passed beneath the avalanche path. Rider 2 followed. Rider 3 saw Rider 2 enveloped by a powder cloud from an avalanche that released above the group. The avalanche occurred around 9:30 AM, 15 minutes after the group had departed the cabins.

Riders 3 through 5 initiated a companion rescue and followed the signal from Rider 2’s avalanche transceiver. Rider 1 was initially unaware that the avalanche occurred until Rider 3 communicated via radio that there had been an avalanche and Rider 2 was in the debris. Rider 1 turned his snowmobile around and saw part of Rider 2’s snowmobile handlebars sticking out of the snow. The group quickly found the lowest distance reading on their transceivers and uncovered Rider 2’s hand. They worked to extricate Rider 2.   

They reached Rider 2’s airway within eight or nine minutes after the avalanche. Rider 2 was bluish in color, not breathing, and had no discernible pulse. They positioned him on the snow surface and began CPR. Rider 1 radioed back to Rider 6 at his cabin to report the accident, and Rider 6 called for emergency rescue using satellite internet at the cabin. One of the other riders at the avalanche also sent out an SOS signal using a handheld satellite device. 

After about 10 minutes of CPR, Rider 2 regained a pulse and began breathing, though he did not regain consciousness. The group tried to keep him warm and comfortable while waiting for Search and Rescue (SAR).

Weather prevented EMS helicopters from landing at the site. SAR teams snowmobiled to the avalanche and arrived shortly after 1:00 PM. Transporting Rider 2 from the remote location 20 miles back to the trailhead took several hours. A waiting ambulance transferred Rider 2 to the hospital. Although Rider 2 was unconscious for many hours after the accident, he regained consciousness and full faculties while recovering at the hospital.

All of the avalanche accidents we investigate are tragic events. We do our best to describe each accident to help the people involved and the community as a whole better understand them. We offer the following comments in the hope that they will help people avoid future avalanche accidents.

This group was very experienced and well-equipped, with decades of riding experience in this area. They knew avalanche conditions were dangerous, and they heard and saw many naturally releasing avalanches during their previous days of riding. They carried appropriate avalanche rescue, communication, and emergency response equipment. They had a plan to manage their risk by choosing low-angle terrain.

Their intended route was one the group members used many times over the decades but had yet to travel this season. In all their previous years, they had never seen the slope produce an avalanche that was even close to the size of the avalanche that ran on the day of the accident. On March 6, avalanche conditions were such that large avalanches could be easily triggered from a distance and from the bottom of a slope. Unfortunately, the travel plan that had kept them safe for so many years failed them on the day of the accident. It is human nature to believe that a route used numerous times over many years will yet again provide safe passage. It is difficult to envision an event you have never witnessed before in familiar terrain. While the group had not seen an avalanche of this size, the trees on the east side of the gully show damage from repeated prior avalanches. This accident highlights the importance of evaluating your trip plan under current conditions each and every time you head into the backcountry.

The group chose to space out and travel single-file through the pass, limiting their exposure to potentially dangerous slopes to only one or two riders at a time. This prevented more people from being caught in the avalanche. 

The group’s preparedness and quick companion rescue likely saved Rider 2’s life. Rider 2’s full recovery after several hours of being unconscious is a very happy result of an event that could have turned out much worse. This highlights the value of traveling with prepared partners and the effectiveness of an organized rescue response system which includes the communication chain, multi-agency coordination, backcountry rescue, and emergency medical care.