2024/03/01 - Washington - Darland Mountain, Ahtanum Meadows

Published 2024/03/25 by Katie Warren and Dallas Glass - Northwest Avalanche Center

An atmospheric river event, January 26-February 1, brought several inches of rain to elevations well above the tops of the peaks in the region. The nearby Greenlake Snotel recorded over 2 inches of rain during that time period. This formed a very thick layer of melt forms. Subsequent weak storms through the first 3 weeks of February brought a few inches of snow to the area. This new snow quickly faceted. The Early February Crust and its associated facets were well documented in nearly all of the Cascade avalanche forecast zones. 

Significant storms beginning February 24 and 27th brought several feet of snow to the East South mountains. The second storm ended cold and produced a generally right-side-up upper snowpack. Cold temperatures and additional precipitation added a few more inches of very low-density snow to the slab. The resulting slab increased in resistance from F at the surface to 1F just above the facets. 

Terrain

Darland Mountain is a broad flat-topped peak stuated about 10 miles east of the Cascade Crest and 12 miles southeast of US Hwy 12’s White Pass. There are several cirque-like bowls along its north and east sides. The largest of these bowls, Super Bowl, is just southwest of the accident site. 

Hidden Bowl is a relatively broad but short feature generally facing northeast (N-NE-E). The bowl's steep faces drop quickly from the nearly flat terrain above. Start zone slope angles typically range from 35-45 degrees, with a few steeper areas near the center of the bowl. A bench immediately below the start zone may prevent this path from frequently producing longer slides. A subtle gully along the paths looker’s right (northwest) margin and knob along the looker’s left (east), channel debris to the north. Vegetative clues suggest the total maximum run length for the path is only 350 ft despite the much wider (800 ft) bowl. The start zone, track, and runout are largely void of trees except for the small, slightly lower-angled section on the looker’s right (northwest). 

The party of two traveled in several locations on and around Darland Mountain prior to the avalanche. This included riding the much larger east-facing Super Bowl. Around 10:30 am, the pair began riding in the Hidden Bowl area. Rider 1 made one attempt to climb the slope. Unable to continue upward in the deep snow, he returned to near the base of the feature to gather more speed for his second attempt. At this point, Rider 2 attempted to climb the bowl. While Rider 1 did not witness the avalanche initiate, he did see Rider 2 and his sled being carried by the slide. 

At least two other persistent slab avalanches were reported in nearby terrain on the day of the accident. One snowmobile triggered slide occurred in a sub-area of the Super Bowl on an NE aspect at about 6700ft. It is not believed the 2 riders were aware of these additional avalanches.

Rider 1 immediately began searching for his partner. However, neither rider was wearing an avalanche transceiver. A small portion of the handlebars from Rider 2’s snowmobile were visible above the snow. Rider 1 located the sled and began searching in the general area. He repeatedly used his shovel to probe the snow and dig, trying to locate his partner. After nearly 30 minutes, Rider 1 determined he needed outside help. He returned to the ridgeline to obtain cell coverage and contacted 911. Rider 1 also called Rider 2’s family. 

Rider 2’s son (Rescuer 1) arrived at the scene with avalanche probes. Rider 1 and Rescuer 1 spot probed uphill of the buried snowmobile, eventually locating the victim about 4 feet below the surface (roughly 20 feet upslope from his snowmobile). 

Upon reaching the victim, he showed no signs of life. Rider 1 once again called 911 at 3:36 pm, alerting authorities they had located the victim and he was deceased. 

Search and Rescue teams received pages at 11:23 am and gathered at the trailhead at 2 pm. They located the scene and assessed the situation. Given the avalanche danger, windy weather, and poor visibility, they determined they could not extract the deceased safely prior to nightfall. 

SAR gathered on the morning of March 2, 2024 at the Ahtanum Meadows office. A grooming crew assisted in the early morning hours by preparing all trails to the accident site and creating a staging area in flat terrain a few hundred feet northwest of the area. SAR team members accessed the site at 11:30 am.  They then used rope-hauling systems to raise the body to the staging area. From there, he was transported to the trailhead and turned over to the coroner at 3 pm 

Northwest Avalanche Center staff visited the site on the morning of March 2, 2024, to collect information, make measurements, and assist SAR where needed.

Avalanche Rescue Gear: 

The riders were not caring a complete set of avalanche rescue gear. While each had a shovel, without the avalanche transceiver and probe, locating a buried partner became significantly more difficult. There is no guarantee that Rider 2 would have been found alive if he was wearing an avalanche transceiver. However, avalanche rescue gear allows for a more timely and efficient location of a buried victim. 

Rescuer 1 brought avalanche probes to the scene. They then effectively used this tool by spot-probing uphill from Rider 2’s sled. Using clues, like the snowmobile, to anticipate a victim's travel path in an avalanche helps focus search efforts on more likely burial locations.

Number of people that crossed start zone before avalanche: 1

Avalanche occurred during: Hill climbing

Location of group in relation to start zone during avalanche: Rider 1 was just outside of the avalanche runout. Rider 2 was on the slope, approximately mid to upper in the avalanche track.

Avalanche Safety Gear Carried: Both snowmobilers carried avalanche shovels but did not carry avalanche transceivers or probes. 

Avalanche Training and Experience at Activity: Rider 1 typically carried avalanche rescue equipment and had some training, although they were not carrying equipment on the day of the accident. Rider 2 had no avalanche equipment and no formal avalanche training. Both were experienced and advanced snowmobilers.

Report on NWAC site