CAIC

Avalanche Details

Location: Ski Hayden Peak west of Ashcroft
State: Colorado
Date: 2024/02/07
Time: Unknown
Summary Description: 2 backcountry skiers caught, 1 partially buried, 1 partially buried-critical
Primary Activity: Backcountry Tourer
Primary Travel Mode: Ski
Location Setting: Backcountry

Number

Caught: 2
Partially Buried, Non-Critical: 1
Partially Buried, Critical: 1
Fully Buried: 0
Injured: 0
Killed: 0

Avalanche

Type: SS
Trigger: AS - Skier
Trigger (subcode): r - A remote avalanche released by the indicated trigger
Size - Relative to Path: R1
Size - Destructive Force: D2
Sliding Surface: O - Within Old Snow

Site

Slope Aspect: NE
Site Elevation: 11700 ft
Slope Angle: 40 °
Slope Characteristic: --

Avalanche Comments

The avalanche occurred on Ski Hayden Peak, at the headwaters of Sawyer Creek, approximately 7 miles south of the town of Aspen. It was a soft-slab avalanche remotely triggered from the bottom of the slope by a pair of backcountry tourers. It was very small relative to the path and produced enough destructive force to bury, injure, or kill a person. The avalanche broke on a layer of facets near the bottom of the snowpack (SS-ASr-R1-D2-O). The avalanche broke on a rocky, uneven slope where the snowpack was notably thinner than adjacent slopes. It broke about 200 feet wide and ran close to 300 vertical feet.

Backcountry Avalanche Forecast

The Colorado Avalanche Information Center’s (CAIC) forecast for the area around Ashcroft for February 7, 2024, rated the avalanche danger at Considerable (Level 3 of 5) at all elevations. The primary problem was Persistent Slab avalanches on west through north to southeast aspects at all elevations and south and southwest aspects above treeline. The likelihood was Likely and the expected size Large to Very Large (D2-D3). The summary statement read:

Dangerous avalanche conditions exist throughout the Elk and West Elk Mountains. You can easily trigger a large and deadly avalanche, you can trigger them from a distance, and they will likely break wider and run farther than you expect. The most dangerous slopes face west through north to southeast where an unusually weak layer of snow was buried by one to two feet of snow during the last storm. Additional snowfall Tuesday night throughout the day Wednesday will increase the danger. You can find safer travel options on slopes that got less than about a foot of snow during the last storm or by simply avoiding travel on or underneath steep slopes on aspects of concern.

Snowpack Summary

A layer of well-developed facets formed on the top of the snowpack during a three-week dry-spell that ended on January 5, 2024. From January 5 to January 20, the nearby Aspen resorts (3 to 6 miles north) reported between 40 to 50 inches of snowfall. Another ten-day dry spell at the end of January created a layer of both near-surface facets and surface hoar. Snow started on February 3 and buried the surface hoar standing upright. There was one to two feet of snow on top of the surface hoar layer by February 7.

Accident Summary

A week before the accident, Skier 1 planned to ski on Ski Hayden Peak on February 7. Ski Hayden Peak is a local name for a point 13,316, a subpeak north of Hayden Peak. Skier 2 joined in a “last-minute decision” that morning. The two skiers arrived at the trailhead around 11:00 AM. They followed a standard route up Sawyer Creek. Skier 1 mentioned the track they were following was filled by recent snow and obscured by the time they reached 11,000 feet.

Without a track to follow, Skier 1 chose a route similar to one he had traveled a year prior. Skier 2 recalls stopping for a few seconds before they began climbing a steeper slope to put on her ski pole wrist straps. Shortly after, Skier 2 heard Skier 1 shout, looked up, and saw an avalanche coming right at them.

The avalanche hit the skiers before either could attempt to get out of the way. The avalanche knocked Skier 1 off his feet, carried him 50 to 100 feet downhill, and tore his skis off. When the avalanche stopped, he was partially buried with his head above the snow. Skier 1 dug himself free within a minute and looked for Skier 2.

The avalanche buried Skier 2, but the tip of her ski pole was above the debris (partially buried-critical). Skier 1 saw the pole, ran over, and swiftly found Skier 2’s hand a few inches under the debris. Skier 1 dug with his avalanche shovel and quickly cleared Skier 2’s airway. Her head was buried about two feet deep. It took about 10 minutes to dig her completely free of the debris.

The skiers eventually found all of their missing equipment. They followed their tracks down and returned to the trailhead around 4:00 PM.

Comments

We do our best to describe avalanche involvements to help the recreational community better understand factors that may have contributed to the outcome. We offer these comments in the hope that they will help people avoid future close calls. It is hard to admit mistakes and expose oneself to criticism. This group's willingness to do so is important in helping the community learn collectively.

Skier 1 read the current avalanche forecast and thought he could navigate to the summit of Ski Hayden Peak and descend safely, based on skiing the same peak at roughly the same date the year prior. Skier 1 repeated a travel plan he completed a year prior under more stable snow and avalanche conditions. The pair traveled on or underneath several steep slopes. The current forecast highlighted the Persistent Slab avalanche problem. Familiarity (McCammon 2002) with an area can increase your confidence in your abilities to safely assess and travel through terrain. Failure to match and alter travel plans to suit current conditions is a common cause of many avalanche accidents.

Skier 2 was not carrying an avalanche transceiver, shovel, or a probe, all essential rescue equipment. Skier 1 knew Skier 2 did not have adequate avalanche rescue equipment and thought they would just assess the terrain before entering anything they deemed too dangerous. The pair was fortunate that Skier 1 could quickly extricate himself from the avalanche debris and that Skier 2 had equipment visible on the snow surface. Without a visual clue or an avalanche transceiver, finding a fully buried skier can be excruciatingly slow and sometimes fatal. They are fortunate the roles were not reversed. If Skier 2 had been partially buried, without avalanche rescue equipment, it is unlikely she would have been able to find and dig out Skier 1 in a short timeframe.

Skier 2 stopped to put her ski pole straps around her wrists just before the avalanche occurred. It is best practice not to have pole straps attached to your wrists when traveling in avalanche terrain, as connected equipment can drag people deeper into moving avalanche debris. We do not know how her ski poles contributed to Skier 2’s burial in this avalanche. In this case, Skier 2’s pole was sticking above the surface and attached to her. This allowed Skier 1 to locate her without a transceiver.

It is best practice not to have pole straps attached to your wrists when traveling in avalanche terrain, as connected equipment can drag people deeper into moving avalanche debris. Skier 2 stopped to put her ski pole straps around her wrists just before the avalanche occurred. She did not want to drop and lose her poles in the steeper terrain. We do not know how her ski poles contributed to Skier 2’s burial in this avalanche. We do know that Skier 1 could see the pole and found Skier 2's hand when he dug down. In this case, having the pole attached to her wrist allowed Skier 1 to find her despite the lack of a transceiver.