2024/02/11 - Colorado - Anthracite Range, east of Ohio Peak

Published 2024/02/20 by Ben Pritchett, Brian Lazar, Ethan Greene, Eric Murrow - Colorado Avalanche Information Center, Crested Butte Avalanche Center

Around the Upper Gunnison Basin, snowfall depths were close to normal for November and the first two weeks of December 2023. Dry and cold weather dominated the weather pattern from mid-December into the first week of January. Snowpack depth dropped well below normal, and snow surfaces became very weak and faceted.

A very snowy couple of weeks started on January 5, 2024. Several natural avalanche cycles occurred on January 11, 14, 15, and 18, including large, wide-breaking avalanches documented in the same basin. Investigators believe the accident site avalanched at least once during this timeframe, leading to a much shallower snowpack than on nearby slopes that did not avalanche.

The last 10 days of January were clear and calm. Forecasters documented a widespread layer of large-grained surface hoar across much of western Colorado. On February 2, light snowfall buried the surface hoar layer, gently preserving the surface hoar upright. Storms lasted until February 10 and steadily built a soft slab atop the surface hoar. The Lake Irwin USGS site, less than four miles north of the accident site, measured 5.5 inches of snow water equivalent since the surface hoar was buried. The winds were mostly light during this period. February 11 dawned clear and chilly.

Skiers 1, 2, and 3 spent February 10, 2024, skiing west of Crested Butte. They skied slopes as steep as 30 to 40 degrees. They observed an avalanche that was likely several days old but otherwise did not experience signs of unstable snow. They discussed skiing the next day in steeper terrain, in a basin on the east end of Ohio Peak, locally referred to as The Playground.

On February 11, they met at the winter closure of Gunnison County Road 12 (Kebler Pass road) around 9 AM. Another friend, Skier 4, joined them. They discussed the avalanche forecast and the plan for the day. They were all aware of an avalanche accident from the previous day in the Crested Butte area, where a snowboarder triggered and was injured in a large avalanche in 40-degree northeast-facing terrain on Snodgrass Mountain (10.3 miles northeast of The Playground). 

They snowmobiled to Ohio Pass. They switched to skis and ascended north-facing terrain. They gained the ridge and could now see their objective on the next ridge across The Playground basin. Although all group members were familiar with this area, this was the first time they saw it this season. They discussed the snow coverage on their intended ski descents and chose to proceed.

During their descent on south-facing terrain into The Playground they experienced one moderate collapse. They transitioned into uphill travel mode and climbed north-facing, forested slopes up to 50 degrees in steepness to gain the ridge above their next planned descent. They experienced a rumbling collapse along the ridgeline that remotely triggered two large avalanches that ran off the south side of the ridge. The group saw the powder clouds as the avalanches ran over beaver ponds in the valley bottom but could not see where the avalanches started. 

The group skied down the north-facing slopes in The Playground, one at a time, using radios to coordinate. They experienced no signs of instability. Notably, two of the skiers descended the slope where Skier 3 would later get caught. 

The group decided to climb up and make another run through the same area. Skier 4 probed along their skin track as they ascended through the steep terrain. He found a much shallower snowpack than he expected. He communicated this to the group, but they did not alter their plan. They gained the ridge again and prepared for their next descent a little after 2:00 PM.

Skier 1 went first. He triggered and skied away from a small soft slab avalanche above a cliff band. The avalanche ran over the cliffs and triggered a larger avalanche that broke approximately three feet deep on the open slope below. Trees and steep terrain obstructed their view, and the group was unaware of the large avalanche below the cliffs at the time. Skier 1 waited in the valley bottom to watch the others ski. Skiers 4 and 2 descended to the skier’s right of Skier 1’s tracks. They watched Skier 3 descend around 2:30 PM. He skied very close to Skier 2’s first track. After about five turns, Skier 3 triggered a soft slab avalanche on the unsupported rocky face.

The avalanche broke approximately 30 feet above Skier 3 and quickly swept him off his feet. The group below watched as Skier 3 deployed his airbag and was swept over the cliff band and onto the broad, open slope below. The initial avalanche triggered a second, larger avalanche on the open slope. This second avalanche added substantial volume to the flowing debris. He went out of view of the group.

The avalanche ran into trees below the open slope, taking Skier 3 for a violent ride. The impact ripped the airbag from his body. Skier 3 came to rest, fully buried about 500 vertical feet below where he triggered the initial avalanche.

The group could not see Skier 3. Skiers 1, 2, and 4 watched the avalanche stop uphill from their location and immediately began a companion rescue. Skiers 1 and 4 climbed up the avalanche debris searching for a transceiver signal. Skier 2 visually inspected the terrain looking for any clues or signs of Skier 3. Approximately 3 minutes after the avalanche, Skiers 1 and 4 acquired a transceiver signal over 100 feet away (50m transceiver reading). Seconds later, Skier 1 spotted Skier 3’s airbag at the base of a tree. The pack was damaged and not attached to Skier 3. Skiers 1 and 4 continued following the signal toward Skier 3, pinpointing his precise location with a probe. About 6 minutes had passed since Skier 3 was buried. They began digging and uncovered Skier 3’s airway less than eight minutes after the avalanche. Skier 2 joined them at the burial site. Skier 3 was breathing but not responsive. The rescuers discovered that he was severely injured. They used a satellite device to call for an emergency response. The Crested Butte Mountain Rescue Team was alerted of the accident at 2:58 PM and began organizing a rescue.

The group administered first aid and used extra clothing to warm Skier 3. They improvised a rescue sled using skis and straps. They began the arduous process of moving Skier 3 downhill toward flat ground they thought would serve as an adequate landing zone for a helicopter. It took the group around half an hour to get Skier 3 to this location. Skiers 2 and 4 returned uphill to retrieve gear while Skier 1 tended to Skier 3. During this time, Skier 3 lost a discernible pulse, and Skier 1 began CPR.

A Care Flight helicopter landed with emergency medical personnel around 3:45 PM who took over medical care. Medical personnel discontinued life-saving efforts around 4:30 PM. Skier 3 did not survive his injuries. He was transported out of the field via helicopter. Skiers 1, 2, and 4 returned to their snowmobiles via a longer, safer egress.

All of the fatal avalanche accidents we investigate are tragic events. We do our best to describe each accident to help the people involved and the community as a whole better understand them. We offer the following comments in the hope that they will help people avoid future avalanche accidents.

This was a highly-skilled, well-equipped group of backcountry travelers with varying levels of recreational avalanche training and years of experience skiing in steep, consequential terrain together, including in The Playground. They knew the Considerable avalanche danger for the day and carried appropriate avalanche rescue, communication, and emergency response equipment. They had a plan to manage their risk by choosing what they believed was a safer snowpack, specific line choices, clear communication, and short-duration exposure of only one person at a time to avalanche terrain.

During the eight days before the accident, the avalanche danger was rated either High (4 of 5) or Considerable (3 of 5). The group said they were starting to “step out” into steeper terrain while the powder was still fresh. The group experienced one moderate and one rumbling collapse prior to the accident. The latter collapse remotely triggered large avalanches on the south side of the ridge they were traveling on. In hindsight, the group acknowledged that these signs were not enough to dissuade them from their intended descent into north-facing terrain. 

The avalanche incident on Snodgrass Mountain the previous day occurred in similar but less steep and cliffy terrain than the Playground. Based on their previous experience, the group expected deeper and more stable snowpack conditions in the Playground compared to Snodgrass Mountain. Their first view of the Playground from the adjacent ridge supported their expectations. By probing, Skier 4 noticed that the snowpack in the area was more shallow than anticipated. This important observation and its implications did not prompt a conversation as to whether a second ski descent in this terrain was an acceptable risk.

Skier 1 triggered a soft slab avalanche on the slope immediately skier’s left of where the fatal avalanche would soon occur. The group discussed the small avalanche over the radio. They figured two of them had skied the terrain feature where Skier 3 planned to go next without triggering avalanches, and a third set of tracks would be fine. The group could not see that the first avalanche became much larger and more destructive below the cliffs. Skier 3 triggered a small avalanche, and then was caught in the much larger avalanche that they had not considered.

The avalanche flowed into trees below the open slope. The treed terrain contributed to the injuries Skier 3 sustained. Skier 3 deployed his avalanche airbag, but it was ripped from his body by the force of the avalanche. The damage to Skier 3’s equipment is a sobering reminder that safety equipment can reduce, but not eliminate, the consequences of getting caught in an avalanche. Examining the cause of death in Colorado avalanche accidents, Sheets et al. (2018) found that trauma accounts for 30% of avalanche deaths. In the case studies, the trauma was typically severe and “likely to cause death rapidly."

The group’s effort to manage their risk through very specific line choices, good communication –including radios–and very short exposure times from fast skiing were not enough to overcome the severity of the terrain. Any avalanche can lead to tragic outcomes in very steep terrain with many obstacles. 

Making on-the-fly decisions to enter more consequential terrain in the field is a factor in many avalanche accidents. Groups tend to have better outcomes when they stick to the objectives they selected during the planning process. That was not the case in this accident. The group continued on their objectives despite triggered avalanches, large collapses, and finding shallower than expected snow. Just as good planning can prevent taking on more risk than anticipated, including alternative plans for lower-risk objectives can be helpful when conditions are not as expected. Without an alternative, it can be easy for a goal-oriented group, or one that is cautious about adjusting plans in the field, to forge along the determined plan. McCammon (2002) identified both familiarity and commitment as important factors contributing to avalanche accidents.  

The group conducted a rapid companion rescue, provided appropriate first aid, and successfully called for outside help. They were prepared to respond to an avalanche accident. Unfortunately, their knowledge, training, equipment, and actions could not overcome the severity of the victim’s injuries in a remote location.

We would like to acknowledge all of the groups and individuals who contributed to this search, rescue, and recovery effort. Some of these groups are staffed by volunteers and they are all integral to backcountry safety in Colorado and our ability to collect and distribute information on avalanche accidents: Gunnison County Sheriff, Crested Butte Mountain Rescue, Irwin Guides, and Careflight of the Rockies. We apologize to anyone we missed.