2024/02/09 - Wyoming - West Fork of Haskins Creek, west of Battle Pass

Published 2024/02/21 by Staff - Bridger Teton Avalanche Center

The Sierra Madre Range experienced periodic drought through the late fall and winter like much of the northern Rockies. Local reports indicate that various weak layers existed in the form of buried surface hoar, crusts and faceted snow. On February 7th, the National Weather upgraded a winter storm watch to a warning when confidence improved that the approaching surge of Pacific moisture would impact the area with high winds and heavy snowfall. The storm delivered 1.5” of snow water equivalent and around ~18” of new snow in the 72-hour period prior to the accident. No wind station exists within a reasonable distance of this area to approximate wind speed and direction, but the cornices overhanging the slope below which they rode indicate wind of a sufficient velocity and duration to transport large amounts of snow. The NWS forecasted westerly winds up to 50 mph in wound prone areas

The deceased, a local 34-year-old man, was riding with a regular companion who owned a vacation home in nearby Encampment. The pair had ridden together regularly. The two had discussed avalanche concerns and had chosen to stay off steep slopes, especially slopes in the alpine areas nearby. During the morning, they had ridden on lower angled, treed slopes and observed no signs of instability like cracking in the snow surface. The two rode slowly to avoid rocks and small trees in the wide, low angle drainage bottom and soon regrouped. After rider one started riding downhill about ten feet away, rider two noticed the failure of the slope. He immediately hit the throttle but was captured briefly by the debris and able to remain upright. Meanwhile, the lead rider was knocked off his snowmachine before the debris stopped moving about 20’ past his track. The second rider circled back and parked his machine at the edge of the debris about 30 feet away. He shouted out to his buried companion who managed to kick his foot above the snow. Rider two walked and crawled through the debris and began to dig with hands. He soon uncovered a waving hand which he tried to pull, first with his hands then he dug down further to lock elbows for better pruchase and pulled again. At this point, he realized he would need to dig with a shovel and returned to his machine, where his shovel was strapped to a bag on the top of his tunnel bag. He broke away the accumulated ice and pried off his frozen shovel and again crawled over the loose and blocky debris to his friend. Digging quickly to his friend's face, he discovered that he had stopped breathing and was pulseless. He dug further to expose enough of him that he could pull him out of the snow to begin CPR. He began CPR but was unable to revive his companion. He then used his SPOT device to summon help. (Fig 4, 5)

All of the fatal avalanche accidents we investigate are tragic events. We do our best to describe each one to help the people involved and the community better understand them. We offer these comments in the hope that they will help people avoid future avalanche accidents.

The two riders intended to avoid avalanche terrain on this day as they understood conditions to be dangerous due to the recent heavy snow and wind. Unfortunately, the pair were riding too close to the base of the slope during a period when a very weak layer of snow made it possible to trigger an avalanche remotely. They had correctly identified the danger of the heavily corniced, wind-loaded 38-degree slope above them but did not maintain adequate distance between themselves and the potential track of the avalanche. Had the pair ridden 10-20’ east of their line they would not have been hit by the debris. This avalanche deposited debris up to nine feet deep in places.  (Fig 6)

The most regrettable decision shared by rider two was the location of his rescue gear. He had taken several avalanche fundamental courses over the years and knew that gear should be carried in a backpack, but the weight of the gear was bothersome, and their intention was the same on this outing as every other; to stay out of dangerous avalanche terrain. The location of the shovel slowed the rescue to some degree though it’s unclear whether the extra minute or two saved would have made a difference. Carrying a beacon, shovel and probe in a backpack is the best practice when riding anywhere near avalanche terrain, but this gear is not a magic bullet. This incident is a reminder that even short duration shallow burials can have a bad outcome, regardless of the speed of the rescue. Careful assessment of potential avalanche runouts is an even better defense.

While this area lacks an avalanche forecast, riders in the area frequently share information on avalanche and riding conditions in various social media groups. This area now has a more durable resource for sharing this information that is not subject to the whims and algorithms of social media platforms. The area is data sparse in terms of weather data but more active use of the Eastern Wyoming Avalanche Information Exchange could help alert riders to elevated avalanche danger. The day prior to this accident, an observation was made of a natural avalanche near the scene of this accident. Recent avalanches are a very strong indicator of the potential for more avalanches. 

Bridger-Teton Avalanche Center staff would like to thank the Carbon County Sheriff's Department, especially Sargent Pat Patterson, and the Department’s SAR team for escorting CAIC staff to the scene. We would also like to thank the survivor for openly sharing information about this tragic incident.