2023/11/25 - Colorado - Marble Peak

Published 2023/12/01 by Brian Lazar and Dylan Craaybeek - Colorado Avalanche Information Center

Seven backcountry tourers (Skiers 1 through 7) met on the morning of November 25 to ski on Marble Peak. They ran into additional friends at the trailhead. Skier 8 joined the larger group. Skier 9 began touring alone, saying he might join the group later. The group of eight reached Marble Peak and skied one at a time down an east-facing slope locally known as "Marble Bowl."

They ascended Marble Peak again. Skier 1 said he planned to descend back to the trailhead down a north-facing bowl off Marble Peak known locally as "The Fridge." He had skied the slope on November 24, and "it was great." Skier 9 joined the group. Collectively, they decided to ski down the Fridge. 

From Marble Peak, they traveled down the ridge to a saddle. Skier 5 performed a ski cut across the top of the slope and did not trigger an avalanche. They planned to ski one at a time and meet at the bottom, starting from different spots along the ridge within about 60 feet of each other. 

Skier 1 descended and stopped in low-angle terrain. Skiers 2 and 3 followed and joined him. Skier 4 began his descent after he thought Skier 3 reached Skier 1. Skier 4 descended further to the skier's right than the others and traveled out of sight of the group waiting on the ridgeline.

Skier 4 took several turns when "the next thing I know I was falling. It happened so quick, I was totally disoriented and the next thing I know I'm submerged under the snow and moving fast." He was fully buried and unable to move as the avalanche slowed. "After what felt like an eternity I felt another wave of debris come and hit me while I was buried and knocked me to the surface." The second wave of debris carried him further downhill. He was able to clear snow from his mouth and was partially buried with his head and arms free when it finally stopped. He dug himself out. 

The avalanche hit the three skiers waiting below. It carried Skiers 1 and 2 several hundred feet downslope and partially buried them with their heads above the snow. Skier 3 was looking downhill when he felt a "massive snowball" hit his back. He was carried about 50 feet down the slope before he managed to ski out of the moving debris.

Skier 3 was in disbelief that he escaped the avalanche. He could see Skiers 1, 2, and 4 but did not know if the avalanche had caught the other five. He began the rescue.

Skier 3 reached Skier 1 first and began to dig him out. They realized excavation would require quite some time. Skier 3 moved to Skier 2, who was not as deeply buried, and freed him from the debris. Skier 2 and 4 returned to dig out Skier 1. Skier 3 put on climbing skins and began searching up the avalanche debris. Skier 3 ascended several hundred feet up the slope before he made voice contact with the other five still on the ridge. 

The skiers on the ridge could hear the others shouting below but could not make voice contact. The group did have radios, but issues with them prevented them from making contact with the group below.  Once they made voice contact with Skier 3, the five descended the bed surface of the avalanche to help with the rescue and search for lost equipment. 

With other steep slopes that had not avalanched above them, they curtailed the search for equipment. They descended through steep terrain back to the trailhead.

We do our best to describe avalanche involvements to help the recreational community better understand factors that may have contributed to the outcome. We offer these comments in the hope that they will help people avoid future close calls. It is hard to admit mistakes and expose oneself to criticism. This group's willingness to do so is important in helping the community learn collectively.

The group began with seven people and grew to nine. Large groups are difficult to manage, and moving through steep, complex avalanche terrain exacerbates these challenges. The group size contributed to ineffective communication between the group members in several ways they identified after the accident:  

• Skier 4 said he felt the Fridge was not an appropriate terrain choice but did not communicate this to the larger group. 
• The group did not discuss specific descent lines for each member before starting down the Fridge. At least a couple members wanted to avoid descending through the area that Skier 4 descended. However, they did not communicate their concerns to the larger group.  
• Once Skier 3 started, the waiting skiers began to get excited, and there was confusion about who would ski next. 
• The lack of a clear plan caused confusion with how many people were caught in the avalanche and where everyone was, complicating the rescue.
• Some radios had low batteries or other malfunctions and proved ineffective.

The group traveled on and skied easterly-facing slopes in the morning. They did not encounter collapsing, cracking, or avalanche activity on these slopes. They used the lack of obvious signs of instability on east-facing terrain to justify traveling into steeper, north-facing terrain. It is critical to compare slopes with similar aspects, elevations, and steepness when backcountry travelers extrapolate information to other terrain features.

Skiers 1, 2, and 3 stopped in low-angle terrain. They were not far enough away from the steep slopes to avoid the avalanche. It is easy to underestimate how far avalanche debris can travel, even across gentle slopes, once it gains momentum. 

The group chose to descend from the accident site to the road below. They traveled through more steep, northeast-facing terrain and are fortunate they did not trigger additional avalanches. A safer but longer route would have taken them back the way they came.