CAIC: Colorado Avalanche Information Center

2023/02/25 - Colorado - Red Lakes Trailhead, near La Manga Pass

Published 2023/03/16 by Accident Officials: Matt Huber, Rebecca Hodgetts - Colorado Avalanche Information Center


Avalanche Details

  • Location: Red Lakes Trailhead, near La Manga Pass
  • State: Colorado
  • Date: 2023/02/25
  • Time: 3:20 PM (Estimated)
  • Summary Description: 1 snowmobiler caught, buried, and killed
  • Primary Activity: Snowmobiler
  • Primary Travel Mode: Snowmobile
  • Location Setting: Backcountry

Number

  • Caught: 1
  • Partially Buried, Non-Critical: 0
  • Partially Buried, Critical: 0
  • Fully Buried: 1
  • Injured: 0
  • Killed: 1

Avalanche

  • Type: HS
  • Trigger: AM - Snowmobile
  • Trigger (subcode): u - An unintentional release
  • Size - Relative to Path: R3
  • Size - Destructive Force: D2.5
  • Sliding Surface: O - Within Old Snow

Site

  • Slope Aspect: SE
  • Site Elevation: 10800 ft
  • Slope Angle: 35 °
  • Slope Characteristic: Planar Slope

Avalanche Comments

The avalanche occurred on an open, southeast-facing slope west of the Red Lakes trailhead on La Manga Pass. It was unintentionally triggered by a snowmobiler. It was large-sized relative to the path and produced enough destructive force to bury, injure or kill a person and break a few trees. The avalanche broke under a hard slab formed by the wind on a layer of faceted crystals above a crust (HS-AMu-R3-D2.5-O). The avalanche broke 1 to 12 feet deep and 160 feet wide. It ran 400 vertical feet into trees at the bottom of the slope. Although the slope was below 11,000 feet in elevation, it was open and untreed, with wind patterns more characteristic of higher-elevation terrain.

Backcountry Avalanche Forecast

The Colorado Avalanche Information Center’s (CAIC) forecast for the area around La Manga Pass on Saturday, February 25, 2023, rated the avalanche danger at Considerable (Level 3 of 5) near and above treeline and Moderate (Level 2 of 5) below treeline. The primary problem was Wind Slab avalanches on all elevations on northwest through north to southeast-facing slopes. The likelihood was Likely, and the expected size was Small to Large (up to D2). The second problem was Persistent Slab avalanches near and above treeline on west through north to east-facing slopes. The likelihood was Possible, and the expected size was Large (D2). The third problem was Loose Wet avalanches at all elevations on east through south to west-facing slopes. The likelihood was Likely, and the expected avalanche size was Small to Large (up to D2). The summary statement read:

The most dangerous areas are wind-loaded slopes. Southwest winds drifted the new snow into thicker slabs on northerly and easterly-facing slopes. Strong and erratic winds built dangerous drifts lower in the terrain than usual, and on wide open slopes below treeline. Avalanches in the new snow could break into weaker snow layers three to four feet deep on slopes facing west through north to east. Avoid areas where you see evidence of recent wind drifting such as fresh cornices, rounded pillows of snow, or a hard, sculpted snow surface. If you experience cracking or collapsing, retreat to slopes around 30 degrees that are sheltered from the wind.

With a plethora of fresh snow on sunny slopes, Saturday’s warm-up may trigger a shed cycle of the new snow from east through south to west-facing slopes during the day. Traveling on steeper slopes with about 8 inches of wet snow increases your chance to trigger a loose avalanche. Move to less steep slopes if you sink past your shins into wet snow or see fresh rollerball activity.

Weather Summary

Snowfall became consistent in December as frequent storms moved through the La Manga Pass area. Between January 21 and 26, 2023, a high-pressure weather system resulted in warm air temperatures, which formed a thick melt-freeze crust on the snow surface on southerly-facing slopes. Another series of snow storms buried this crust in late January. A potent winter storm with very strong southwest winds moved through the area from February 20 to 23. During this period, the Cumbres Trestle SNOTEL, about 7 miles south of the accident site at 10,040 feet, recorded an increase of 3.4 inches of snow water equivalent (SWE). Total SWE was 137% of the 30-year median on February 25

Snowpack Summary

The seasonal snowpack began accumulating in late October. Consistent snowfall through December, with several wind events and periods of warm temperatures, formed multiple cohesive layers of snow separated by melt-freeze crusts and faceted layers. In places, snowfall and winds during late February drifted more than 12 feet of snow over the crust that was buried in late January.

Events Leading to the Avalanche

Rider 1 met five friends for a day of snowmobiling at the Red Lakes trailhead, which is at the junction of FS Road 114 and State Highway 17. They rode south of the highway in the morning. Two of the original six left at lunch and two other friends joined the group. Riders 1 through 5 were experienced snowmobilers and very familiar with the area. All six had two-way radios. Riders 2, 3, and 4 wore avalanche transceivers and carried shovels and probes in their airbag backpacks. The group did not discuss avalanche conditions and was unaware of the current avalanche danger rating.

After lunch, the six riders rode in the meadows north and west of the highway. Around 2:30 PM, several rode down a 30-degree, southeast-facing slope adjacent to the slope where the avalanche would occur later in the day. During this time, Rider 3 rode toward the southern end of the slope that would eventually avalanche. He felt a collapse and saw shooting cracks. He returned to the meadow and told Rider 4 what he experienced. The six riders regrouped in the meadows around 3:00 PM.

Accident Summary

Riders 1, 2, 3, and 6 left the rest of the group in the meadow and rode north. They traveled through terrain they rode earlier in the day. Rider 1 was in front. He rode through the area where Rider 3 felt the collapse and then onto a slope they had not yet crossed. He rode up and across the steepest portion of the slope and triggered the avalanche. Rider 2 saw Rider 1 get separated from his snowmobile and disappear into the moving debris.

Rescue Summary

Riders 2 and 3 yelled, “avalanche call 911” to the others and ran toward the avalanche. Knowing that Rider 1 was not wearing an avalanche transceiver, Riders 2 and 3 searched the debris for visual clues and spot probed below Rider 1’s last seen point. Rider 2 radioed Rider 4 and clarified that there had been an avalanche and that Rider 1 was missing. Rider 2 then triggered the SOS on his personal locator beacon. There is no cell phone reception in the area. Rider 4 rode to the trailhead to get help. Rider 6 was a novice snowmobiler and was instructed to wait in the meadow. 

Word spread quickly as other snowmobilers in the area heard the radio traffic or talked with Rider 4 at the trailhead and a group of riders headed to the avalanche to assist with the search. They organized probe lines, working down the avalanche debris from Rider 1’s last seen point. By the end of the day, approximately 30 people were part of the search including members of Alamosa Search and Rescue (ASAR), United States Forest Service (USFS), and Conejos County Sheriff's department. They continued to search for Rider 1 until nightfall.

The search resumed at 7:30 AM on February 26. A large group of community volunteers, ASAR, Conejos County Sheriff's Department, USFS, and forecasters from the Colorado Avalanche Information Center (CAIC) continued searching the avalanche debris with probe lines. Wolf Creek Ski Area sent two avalanche rescue dog teams and a RECCO detector. Strong winds and snowfall began in the afternoon. The search was suspended around 1:30 PM as weather conditions deteriorated.

The search resumed on February 27. Due to snowfall and strong wind overnight, Conejos County made a request through the Colorado Department of Public Safety for aid to mitigate the avalanche hazard to the search area. Staff from the Colorado Department of Transportation, USFS, and the CAIC used explosives to reduce the avalanche hazard on adjacent slopes.  Members from Alamosa, Mineral, and Rio Grande Search and Rescue groups organized another very large group of community volunteers to probe the debris. 

Searchers found Rider 1 around 10:30 AM, approximately 15 feet downhill of his snowmobile. The avalanche swept him through trees. He was buried two to three feet deep. Searchers used chainsaws to clear tree debris to excavate Rider 1.

Comments

All of the fatal avalanche accidents we investigate are tragic events. We do our best to describe each accident to help the people involved and the community as a whole better understand them. We offer the following comments in the hope that they will help people avoid future avalanche accidents.

You can do a few things before leaving your house to stay safer in the backcountry. One is to read the local avalanche forecast, which gives you an idea of dangerous slopes and safer areas. Then make a plan for the day that keeps you out of hazardous areas by deciding which slopes you should avoid. This is a proactive way to avoid any avalanche involvement. 

Another thing you can do is learn to recognize signs of unstable snow, like recent avalanche activity and cracking or collapsing snow. This can help you adjust your avalanche safety plan during the day. Rider 3 recognized the collapsing and cracking, but that information was not communicated to the whole group.

A third thing to do is to purchase avalanche safety equipment and practice with it often. When someone is buried in an avalanche, their best chance of survival comes from being searchable. People on the surface need a way to find them, and they need to find them quickly. Rider 1 was not wearing an avalanche transceiver, so probing in the snow was the only option the other riders had to locate him. They worked downhill from Rider 1’s last seen point and his snowmobile to optimize their chances of finding him. Finding someone buried in avalanche debris through probing is a difficult task, and the mix of snow and broken trees made it even more difficult. The group was unable to find Rider 1 on the first day, and the chance of a live recovery drops precipitously after someone is buried for more than 30 minutes. 

Local riders use a common two-way radio channel to communicate between groups on Cumbres and La Manga Passes. The common channel, quick activation of the personal locator beacon, and Rider 4 traveling to the trailhead to find help meant many people converged on the avalanche to assist with the search. This level of response for a probeline search is both rare and invaluable. However, probeline searching is challenging under any circumstance, and managing impromptu rescuers is even more so. Well-trained probeline searchers with strict organization often struggle to find people buried in avalanche debris. It is difficult to keep the line straight and keep the probe spacing consistent without practice and a probeline leader that is outside of the line. Outlining and tracking the search area, organizing teams to investigate potential strikes without disturbing the probeline, and even determining if there is a positive strike vs. an object or hardness change in the debris are difficult tasks to accomplish with even the most determined group of impromptu searchers.

The level of community support for this search effort was truly impressive. Friends and family of Rider 1 and over a hundred members of the community joined the search. People traveled several hours to add to the effort. The Conejos County Sheriff's Office enlisted help from the Colorado Search and Rescue Association as well as search and rescue teams from adjacent counties, Wolf Creek Ski Area, and several local, state, and federal government agencies. The outpouring of support and the number of volunteers over the three-day search is a reflection of Rider 1’s ties to the local community and his involvement in the snowmobile community.

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