2022/02/25 - Colorado - Yule Creek

Published 2022/03/05 by Brian Lazar, Dylan Craaybeek - Colorado Avalanche Information Center

Snow began to accumulate in the Marble area in early October, but the snowpack remained shallow and weak until mid-December. A series of storms from December 23 through January 3 added significant snow, and a widespread avalanche cycle resulted. The rest of January was unusually dry. The snowpack below treeline faceted extensively through February 15, when storms resumed.

Snowfall gradually accumulated on top of the weak, faceted snowpack. Avalanche activity gradually increased until February 22. Snowfall and strong winds caused a spike in avalanche activity, and the CAIC issued an Avalanche Warning with High (Level 4 of 5) danger on February 23 and 24. The CAIC documented 89 avalanches in the Aspen zone between February 22 and 24 on west to north to east aspects at all elevations. The Avalanche Warning expired at 5:00 PM on February 24, and was replaced with a Special Avalanche Advisory warning about dangerous backcountry avalanche conditions from February 25 to 27.

We refer to group members involved in this accident “hikers” in this narrative. However, their primary objective on the day of the accident was not outdoor recreation, but rather to travel to a private backcountry home.

Hikers 1 through 4 and two dogs arrived in the Town of Marble on the afternoon of February 25. The primary purpose of their trip was to travel to a private backcountry home located in lower Yule Creek, approximately 1 mile to the southeast of town where they planned to spend the weekend. They parked at the bottom gate of the Marble quarry road (Gunnison County Road 3C), and began hiking to the home shortly after 1:00 PM, following an unmaintained road. 

Hikers 1 through 3 traveled on snowshoes, while Hiker 4 walked on foot. Hiker 4 was recovering from a previous lower leg injury and had physician instructions to limit his walking, so he followed in the tracks of the other three group members to make traveling easier. They traveled around half the distance to the home, and reached a bridge over Yule Creek around 2:00 PM. Hiker 4 was in too much pain to continue walking, so the group decided that Hiker 4 would wait at the bridge while Hikers 1, 2, 3 and the two dogs would continue to the home. They planned to retrieve a UTV fitted with snow tracks parked at the home, and return to the bridge to pick up Hiker 4.

There are a couple junctions with historic mining roads between the bridge and the home site. At one junction, there is a fork with both an upper and lower road. The two roads parallel one another, and both lead to the home site. Hiker 4 was aware that the lower road posed potential avalanche risk when snow covered. He told Hikers 1 through 3 that they should stay on the upper road and avoid travel on the lower road. 

While he waited at the bridge, Hiker 4 became uneasy and uncomfortable, stating “I had a bad feeling”. After 5 to 10 minutes, Hiker 4 began to limp and crawl his way towards the home. Hiker 4 eventually reached the fork in the road, and noted that Hikers 1, 2, and 3’s tracks followed the lower road, the wrong way. He decided he would continue on the upper road where he would either be able to look down and see the other hikers, or run into them returning down the upper road on the UTV. 

Hikers 1, 2, and 3 continued toward the house. Hikers 1 and 2 saw some collapsing, “moving blocks of snow”, and cracking snow as they hiked along the road. Around 2:30 PM, the three hikers and two dogs reached the fork in the road and followed the lower road. They traveled a few hundred yards under steep west-facing slopes when they triggered the avalanche from below. Hiker 1 was in the lead, saw the avalanche first, and yelled “Run!” All three were caught in the moving debris and swept off the road towards the gully of Yule Creek below. Hiker 1 and both dogs were completely buried in the gully. The avalanche carried Hiker 2 into the gully, and he was buried with snow over his head and face (partial burial-critical). He was able to clear the snow from his face with a free hand, but he could not extricate himself. The avalanche tangled Hiker 3 in some vegetation upslope of the others. He was buried to his waist.

No one in the group was carrying avalanche rescue gear so they dug with their hands and snowshoes. Hiker 3 was able to dig himself out and then run over to help Hiker 2. With some difficulty, Hiker 3 helped extricate Hiker 2, and in the process Hiker 2 lost his boot and snowshoe, leaving one foot in just a sock. Hikers 2 and 3 then began to frantically search and dig for Hiker 1.

Below him, Hiker 4 heard the screams of Hikers 2 and 3 calling for each other and Hiker 1. Hiker 4 could see some of the avalanche from the upper road, and attempted to make his way down to his companions. Hiker 4 was knocking down more avalanche debris onto the accident site, so he stopped descending and tried yelling instructions to Hikers 2 and 3. Digging blindly with their hands and snowshoes was ineffective, so Hiker 4 told Hikers 2 and 3 to run back to town and get help. Hikers 2 and 3 climbed back to the lower road and began traveling back the way they had come. Hiker 3 was moving faster than Hiker 2, who lost a boot in the avalanche and had one foot covered in only a sock, so Hiker 2 told Hiker 3 to run ahead and get help.

Hiker 3 ran to the Marble Firehouse and banged on the doors, but there was no one there. He knocked on the door of a nearby home, and the resident let Hiker 3 inside and called 911 at 3:15 PM. Meanwhile Hiker 4 ran on his injured leg to the home. He had to shovel snow and break down a shed door to get the generator and internet going. He then called his father, the homeowner, who called a local resident he knew in Marble. Hiker 4 retrieved the UTV and drove to Marble. Hiker 4 and a Marble resident shuttled an initial team of rescuers back to the avalanche site. They determined there was too much avalanche hazard to proceed with a search in the dark.

The rescue continued the following morning, February 26. Rescuers probed the likely burial locations in the creek bed and found Hiker 1 and the two dogs around 11:30 AM. They were buried around 4 feet (130cm) deep. Hiker 1's body was recovered that evening, and members from West Elk Mountain Rescue returned on February 27 to recover the two dogs. In total, the rescue involved local residents, West Elk Mountain Rescue (WEMR), Carbondale Fire, Mountain Rescue Aspen (MRA), and staff from the Gunnison County Sheriff's office and the Colorado Avalanche Information Center.

All of the fatal avalanche accidents we investigate are tragic events. We do our best to describe each one to help the people involved and the community as a whole better understand them. We offer these comments in the hope that they will help people avoid future avalanche accidents.

All fatal accidents are tragic events, but this is a particularly sad accident since the group had no intention of entering avalanche terrain. The group’s primary objective on the day of the accident was not outdoor recreation, but rather to travel to a private backcountry home.They were simply unaware of the hazard along the lower road. One wrong turn made the difference between an enjoyable weekend at a house with friends and a tragic outcome. 

This accident highlights the importance of trip planning and basic avalanche awareness when traveling in snow-covered mountains, regardless of your activity. Even a short hike along an unmaintained road requires planning. There are many steep, avalanche-prone slopes in the Colorado mountains. Identifying terrain to avoid is an important part of planning. Once identified, it is critical that all group members understand the plan and what they need to avoid. Hikers 1, 2, and 3 were confused on which road to take, and chose incorrectly. Clear communication between group members could have prevented this fatal error.

Obtaining current information on avalanche conditions is part of preparing for a day in the mountains. The group was not aware of current avalanche conditions or that information was available through the CAIC. On the day of the accident, the CAIC forecast described very dangerous conditions and emphasized that avalanches could be triggered from the bottom of slopes. The group may have been able to identify and avoid the slope that produced the avalanche if they had read the forecast. 

The group did observe “moving snow” on their way in, and small blocks of snow releasing off the road cuts. They did not recognize these as signs of unstable snow and elevated avalanche hazard. Shortly after the fork, the lower road goes right through the middle of a steep gully wall. The side of the gully is steep enough to produce an avalanche and the narrow bottom of the gully creates a terrain trap; a terrain feature that increases the consequences of even a small avalanche. It was a clear sunny day, so the steep slopes were visible to the group, but they did not recognize that the combination of these slopes and the terrain trap posed a serious risk. 

The group was not carrying avalanche rescue equipment, so Hikers 2 and 3 could not locate Hiker 1’s burial location with either a transceiver or probe. We do not know the outcome would have been different if the group had avalanche rescue equipment, but we do know that having this equipment and knowing how to use it greatly improves the chances of a successful rescue. 

Hikers 2 and 3 exited the accident site by returning on the lower road, and traveling under steep slopes that had not avalanched. It is very fortunate they did not trigger additional avalanches on their way out.

A note on classifications in the avalanche accident record for the United States. The United States Forest Service began tracking fatal avalanche accidents in the 1960s and this database is currently managed by the Colorado Avalanche Information Center and the USFS National Avalanche Center. The data record contains two fields that attempt to classify the activity of the people involved in the accident: Primary Activity and Primary Travel Mode. There is a list of possible choices for each one of these entries in the data record. We chose Resident and Snowshoers for these two database fields because the activity and motivation of the group were more akin to activities done in and around occupied structures and domestic areas than recreational areas. One member of the group traveled on foot, but the three directly involved in the avalanche traveled on snowshoes. We refer to the four people involved in this accident “hikers” in this narrative for simplicity.