2020/01/07 - Idaho - Wardner Peak, Bitterroot Mountains

Published 2022/03/08 by Jeff Thompson, Simon Trautman - Idaho Panhandle Avalanche Center, National Avalanche Center

IPAC observed a  snow profile in the crown of the '16 to 1' avalanche two days after the slides (Figure 5). During those two days, approximately 10-12 inches of additional snow fell. The ground cover in that area is talus, and depth hoar and basal facets made up the bottom third of the snowpack. Also within that bottom third of the snowpack was a thin rain crust and a buried surface hoar layer (Figure 6). Stability tests suggest that the surface hoar likely failed initially, resulting in the avalanches. The middle of the snowpack consisted of several layers of relatively soft snow, and the upper 20+ inches were new snow from the January 6-8 storm.

The accident occured on a ski run called '16 to 1'. This run spans much of the northeasterly aspect of Wardner Peak. This area was opened to public skiers for the first time of the season on January 7th. There are two ways skiers can access '16 to 1': across a mid-slope traverse, or via a hiking route to the top of Wardner Peak (Figure 7). 

On January 7th, the Silver Mountain Ski Patrol kept the area closed until just before 11:00 AM. Upon opening the terrain, several groups began side-stepping along the traverse and hiking to the ridge. Witnesses recall that the traverse was not yet established. As a result, the lead skier was breaking trail and moving slowly; at one point, at least 10 people were backed up along the traverse. Several riders skied downhill from the traverse, leaving seven skiers in the group approaching '16 to 1'. At approximately 11:00 AM, the leading skiers made it out of the trees and continued to cut the traverse while others in the group were descending, or preparing to descend. Witnesses report that there were no tracks on the slope at this time. The order of the seven skiers (from front to back of the line) is as follows: 1. Warren Keyes, 2. Carl Humphries, 3. William Fuzak, 4. Ken Scott, 5. Rebecca Hurlen-Patano, 6. Scott Parsons, and 7. Molly Hubbard. Figure 8 is a likely reconstruction of their order and placement immediately prior to the accident.

The first avalanche broke a short distance above the seven skiers and ran 500-600 vertical feet (Figure 2). Rebecca and Warren were left partially buried and were able to look around, connect verbally, and begin to extricate themselves. Rebecca also remembers seeing Scott’s arm and pole above her (on the slope) and Bill’s helmet below. Bill remembers punching his fist up to the surface as the slide stopped and waving in hopes that someone would see him. Ken remembers being able to see light and could move his right hand enough to clear snow from his face. We don't know what Carl, Scott and Molly experienced during this time. Based on a 911 link from Carl’s phone, it is likely that he was partially buried and was able to dial or voice activate the call, but there is no record of Carl talking to dispatch. Based on Molly’s final location in the debris, it is likely that she skied the skiers right treeline and was struck by the first avalanche as she traversed left across the bottom of '16 to 1'.  

Rebecca was able to free herself and crawl to Bill. Warren worked for a minute or two to dig out his skis and was close to being free of the debris. At this point, all four skiers remember a loud rumbling and shaking sensation immediately prior to being overrun by the second avalanche. 

The second slide was larger than the first. A witness on the traverse described it this way: “The visibility was poor, foggy and snowing -- I was watching a narrow runnel of snow (kind-of like a sluff) moving downslope just past the treeline when the entire mountain started to move … I’ve never seen anything like it … it was loud, 4-6 feet deep … snow moving as far as I could see across the slope.” As the second avalanche overran the seven skiers, Warren was further buried up to his armpits, Rebecca was carried another 25-30 feet downslope and again left partially buried, and Scott, Ken, Bill, Carl, and Molly were further buried under a significant amount of debris. Figure 9 depicts their final placement.   

The second avalanche clearly involved snow above the first slide, but it is not clear if it was triggered from the traverse, from somewhere farther up the peak, or if the remaining slab failed naturally on its own. Skiers coming from the top of the run via the hiking route describe skiing over a large crown and onto the bed surface after the two slides occurred (Figure 10). 

A search was started immediately by those on scene. Several bystanders called 911 (shortly after 11am), and more than one individual skied to the closest lift and notified the operator, who in turn called the ski patrol. Rebecca was able to extricate herself. Warren was stuck for 20-30 minutes and needed bystanders’ help to get out.  Scott, Ken, Bill, Carl and Molly were not visible. 

At approximately 11:05 AM, the Silver Mountain Ski Patrol was notified of the avalanche and responded. All witnesses described a chaotic scene. The debris field was extensive, and the rescuers were unsure how many people were buried. Over the next hour, the rescuers found three buried skiers (Figure 9), two of whom survived the ordeal. Bill Fuzak was found with a hasty probe strike approximately 40 minutes after the avalanche. He was buried approximately 7 feet deep and survived. Carl Humphreys was found with a probe strike approximately 45 minutes after the avalanche. He was buried approximately 9 feet deep and did not survive. Ken Scott was found with a probe strike approximately 55 minutes after the avalanche. He was buried approximately 9 feet deep and survived. Rebecca’s recollection of at least two of the partial burial locations (after the initial slide and before the second) allowed rescuers to focus their search and probably contributed significantly to Bill and Ken’s rescue. 

Scott Parsons was found at 6:30 PM by a rescue dog alert and subsequent probe strike. He was buried 12 feet deep and did not survive. At that time, no other people were reported missing. Early the next morning (January 8th), Molly Hubbard's father called the Silver Mountain Ski Patrol and reported he had not heard from his daughter. Her van was located in the parking lot, and the search resumed. 

On January 8th, professional rescuers searched the area with a handheld RECCO search device (from Schweitzer Resort) but did not receive a positive signal. At around 4:00 PM, Federal resources reported that Molly’s phone data indicated she was located in the Morningstar avalanche debris. The rescue team used this information to move the focus of the search, but the phone location data proved to be inaccurate. That evening, an Incident Command System (ICS) was enacted and additional resources were organized for the next morning.

Two Bear Air, a helicopter rescue operation, arrived at first light on January 9th (Figure 16). Their helicopter mounted RECCO SAR detector narrowed the search to a 30 foot by 30 foot area in the '16 to 1' debris. Rescue dog teams indicated the presence of human scent in this area. The inability of either RECCO units or avalanche dogs to pinpoint a location suggested a deep burial scenario. Rescuers began a sequence of fine probing, strategic stripping of snow with a snowcat, and additional fine probing and dog work (Figure 16) . It took three sequences to locate Molly Hubbard at around 12:30 PM. She was equipped with RECCO reflectors in both her jacket and her pants. She was buried 21 feet deep and did not survive.

Figures 11-17 depict the rescue. 

Fatal avalanche accidents are tragic events. We describe them to help the people involved and the community as a whole to better understand them. We offer these comments in the hope that they will help people avoid future avalanche accidents. We do not intend to place blame on any of the involved parties or imply that any particular action or decision would have prevented this tragic event.

The rescue involved many people and resources and several lives were saved. Members of the community, Silver Mountain employees, Schweitzer Mountain Ski Area Employees, Shoshone County Sheriff and Fire, local Search and Rescue groups, and many more helped in the rescue effort. 

Things to consider: 

• In-bounds avalanches: Avalanche accidents inside operating  ski areas are rare. When they do occur, it is difficult to quickly determine the number of people involved and/or missing.
• Consequences: The avalanche(s) flowed into a small gully, or ‘terrain trap’, at the base of the run. This resulted in deep burials which complicated an already challenging rescue scenario.
• Searchability: Carrying avalanche transceivers and RECCO reflectors increases your chance of being quickly located if you are buried by an avalanche.
• Education: Avalanche education and awareness played an important and positive role in this event. Previous avalanche education and training was apparent in those caught in the avalanche, the people notifying the ski patrol, those initiating  the hasty search, and the volunteers serving on probe lines. 

This report is a cooperative effort between Jeff Thompson of the Idaho Panhandle Avalanche Center and Simon Trautman of the US Forest Service National Avalanche Center. Silver Mountain Resort provided  information and access to the accident site. Survivors and bystanders provided first hand accounts and perspective. Thanks to the rescuers and to those who helped with this report. Our heartfelt condolences to the families and friends of the people lost in this event. Please direct questions to nac@avalanche.org.