Avalanche Details
- Location: Lost Mine Creek, east of Wolf Creek Pass
- State: Colorado
- Date: 2016/02/02
- Time:
4:30 PM
(Estimated)
- Summary Description: 2 snowmobilers caught, 1 partially buried, 1 fully buried and killed
- Primary Activity: Snowmobiler
- Primary Travel Mode: Snowmobile
- Location Setting: Backcountry
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Number
- Caught: 2
- Partially Buried, Non-Critical: 1
- Partially Buried, Critical: 0
- Fully Buried: 1
- Injured: 0
- Killed: 1
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Avalanche
- Type: SS
- Trigger: AM - Snowmobile
- Trigger (subcode): u - An unintentional release
- Size - Relative to Path: R3
- Size - Destructive Force: D2
- Sliding Surface: O - Within Old Snow
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Site
- Slope Aspect: E
- Site Elevation: 9660 ft
- Slope Angle: 40 °
- Slope Characteristic: Convex Slope
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Avalanche Comments
The avalanche was a soft slab, unintentionally triggered by a snowmobiler. The avalanche was medium size relative to the path, large enough to bury and kill a person, and broke into old snow layers (SS-AMu-R3-D2-O). The avalanche released on a slope approximately 40 degrees in steepness, below treeline (around 9660 ft), and facing east. The avalanche was approximately 2 feet deep, 115 feet wide, and ran 170 vertical feet. It released on a layer of facets 2mm in size with a Hand Hardness Index value of 4 Finger + that sat atop a thin melt-freeze crust. The alpha angle for this event was 40 degrees. This was a Persistent Slab avalanche.
Weather Summary
A vigorous storm system moved through the Wolf Creek Pass area from January 30th through February 2nd, 2016. The storm deposited a total of 34 inches of snow with 3.7 inches of snow-water equivalent (SWE) as measured at the CAIC snow study plot at the summit of Wolf Creek Pass, 6 miles west of the accident site at 10,900 feet. Strong winds accompanied the storm, averaging 20 to 30 miles per hour (mph) and gusting to 68 mph.
On the morning of the accident (February 2nd), CAIC forecasters measured two additional inches of new snow at the CAIC study plot. The day started cold with nighttime low temperatures around 4 F. Afternoon temperatures climbed into the mid-teens (F) with very light southwest winds (averaging around 5 mph) as measured at the Colorado Department of Transportation Alberta Snowshed weather station, 5 miles west of the accident site at an elevation of 10,400 feet.
Snowpack Summary
The snowpack in the area of the accident site, 6 miles east of Wolf Creek Pass, is often thinner with a more fragile structure than that found closer to Wolf Creek Pass. This winter (2015-16) was no exception. After a relatively dry fall, snowfall in November and December was above average. Snowfall in January was well below average at Wolf Creek Pass before the storm leading up to the accident arrived. During the latter half of January, the lack of snow combined with some very warm temperatures created a complex structure of weak faceted snow and melt-freeze crusts at and just below the snow surface. As early as a week before the accident, snowpack tests and snowpack observations on east aspects indicated that this structure would be a problem when the next storm arrived.
Events Leading to the Avalanche
On February 2, 2016, a group of five snowmobilers (Riders 1 through 5) departed from the Tucker Ponds trailhead east of Wolf Creek Pass around 8AM. The group was snowmobiling in the Lost Mine Creek drainage between Campo Mollino and Park Creek. Some members of the group had ridden in this area on two occasions earlier in the season, so they were familiar with the terrain. The same group of five also rode in this same area on the day prior to the accident, and observed two small naturally running avalanches. They were aware of the ongoing avalanche warning, and at least a couple members of the group read the avalanche forecast.
The group left the trailhead that day with the goal of riding in open meadows. Given their intention to avoid avalanche terrain, they elected to leave their transceivers and probes behind in their trailer. They did bring along a couple of shovels, stored in their tunnel bags, to help them extricate stuck snowmobiles should the need arise.
Around 1:30 PM, the group was riding along Pass Creek Rd (USFS 390) towards Trail Park, when Rider 2's snowmobile has a mechanical problem. Riders 1 and 2 were attempting to fix a snow-packed throttle limit switch. The throttle finally broke free and the snowmobile lurched away from them and over the road bank and into the gully feature below. Riders 1 and 2 decided to descend into the gully on foot to inspect the snowmobile, while Riders 3, 4, and 5 drove around to see if exiting the bottom of the gully would be an option. The group members were in periodic but spotty radio communication with each other.
Riders 1 and 2 were in the gully for two to three hours working to assess and repair the damage done to the snowmobile. As nightfall was approaching, Rider 3 urged Riders 1 and 2 to get out of the gully, and leave the snowmobile where is it was if need be. Rider 1 climbed back up to his snowmobile parked on Pass Creek Rd. The plan was for Rider 1 to drive his snowmobile into the gully and put in an exit track out of the bottom of the feature. Rider 1 was having difficulty breaking an exit trail, so Rider 2 then gave it a try still using Rider 1's snowmobile, while Rider 1 was watching. They were both in the bottom of the gully feature.
Accident Summary
At approximately 5:00 PM, Rider 2 triggered the avalanche while descending the gully feature on Rider 1's snowmobile. The avalanche quickly overtook Riders 1 and 2. Rider 2 was partially buried up to his neck, while still on top of the snowmobile he was riding. Rider 1 was completely buried about 3 feet deep.
Rider 2 was able to struggle and dig himself out of the debris by getting his knees, and eventually his feet, on the handlebars of the buried snowmobile he was still standing on. Rider 2 struggled his way back to where Rider 1 was standing prior to the avalanche, and started to dig in the area with his hands. He quickly realized he needed help, and made one more exhausting struggle to get out of the gully and reconnect with Riders 3 through 5.
Rescue Summary
The group obtained cell coverage and made a 911 at approximately 6:00 PM. Riders 2 through 5 left the scene to go back to the Tucker Ponds trailhead and meet emergency response services. Local riders, personnel from the Wolf Creek Ski Area, Mineral and Rio Grande County Sheriff's Offices, Archuleta County Emergency Management, and Upper San Juan Search and Rescue all responded to the call. The first responders arrived at the Tucker Ponds trailhead a little before 7:00 PM, where they met Riders 2 through 5.
The response party put together a team of 8 people, consisting of: 4 members of the Wolf Creek Ski Area (WCSA) and two rescue dogs, 2 members Archuleta County Emergency Management, and Riders 2 and 4 who led the team to the accident site. They departed the trailhead on snowmobiles a little after 9:00 PM.
The arrived at a staging area approximately 400 yards from the accident site around 10:00 PM. From there the 4 WCSA members set out on skis to the accident site along with the two rescue dogs. They arrived at the site just after 10:30 PM. The dogs both focused on an area of debris near the toe of the slope, and alerted in the same location within 5 minutes. Shortly thereafter, WCSA responders got a probe strike and confirmed the dogs' alerts. They had the victim extricated around 11:00 PM.
The extrication team brought the victim back to the staging area. From the staging area, they brought him out via snowmobile and rescue toboggan. The rescuers arrived back at the Ticker Ponds trailhead just before 1:00 AM on February 3rd.
Comments
This accident is the result some critical factors combining to produce this tragic outcome. The terrain trap/gully feature allowed debris from a moderately sized avalanche to pile up deeply for the size of the avalanche. The persistent weak layers in the snowpack allowed one member of the group to trigger the avalanche from below. With Persistent Slab avalanches it is possible to initiate a crack from low-angle terrain that then runs onto a steeper slope above and releases the avalanche.
The group was aware of the dangerous avalanche conditions and the significance of the natural avalanches from the previous day. Their intent was to avoid avalanche terrain and have fun riding in flat and low angle powder meadows. Unfortunately, a snowmobile lurched off the intended route due to a mechanical issue and went into a gully feature that the group did not recognize as dangerous avalanche terrain. They were well below treeline, the terrain feature was small, and there were lots of trees everywhere. It's an unfortunate situation of not recognizing small tree-covered slopes as potential avalanche terrain, nor the consequences of the gully terrain trap.
The group was not carrying companion rescue gear (transceivers and probes), and the only shovels they had were carried on the snowmobiles. Thus, they could not attempt a companion rescue. It can not be known if a companion rescue would have been successful, but the outcome could not have been any worse.
Media
Images
Snowpits
Figure 11: Fracture line profile.